Attributional models of depression have not been tested adequately in naturalistic situations involving personally relevant events. In the present study, causal attributions along the dimensions of perceived control, locus of causation, stability, intentionality, and globality, and related cognitions of degree of upset, expectation of the event, predicted recurrence, and resultant uncertainty were obtained for naturally occurring stressful events from 34 moderately depressed college students, from 30 students who had encountered high levels of personal stress but had not become depressed, and from 35 nondepressed controls. Contrary to predictions from attributional models, the groups did not differ in their causal ascriptions. However, the groups did differ significantly in their nonattributional cognitions as evaluated by an overall multivariate test. Further, depressed students were significantly more likely to report greater upset and more uncertainty in their lives as a result of stress than either of the nondepressed groups. These results suggest that cognitions about consequences may play a mediating role in the development of depression, and further investigation of such cognitive constructs may improve existing cognitive models of depression.
Contemporary models of psychological and physical response to stressful events place an increasing emphasis on the role of cognitive events. Individuals' appraisals of the causes and consequences of the events, and not just the environmental realities, are hypothesized to play a significant role in determining dysfunctional affective and behavioral responses to stressful events.
It is in the realm of depressive reactions to stress that theories about cognitive mechanisms have been most fully elaborated. Some of Beck's (1967) pioneering hypotheses about depressive thinking and the more recent ones of Seligman (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978) have been reframed in the language of attribution theory. Analyses of the causes of events, especially when couched in terms of dimensions such as locus of causality, stability, controllabil-ity, intentionality, and globality, have been somewhat useful in distinguishing depressed and nondepressed individuals' responses. However, the relationships between causal ascriptions and depression are by no means consistent across different situations and populations.
There are several problems with the way in which previous studies have been conducted. Among these are the use of minimally depressed subjects, the use of contrived experiments rather than personally meaningful situations, and the nearly exclusive use of questionnaires to assess attributions. Perhaps the most significant limitation of all is the focus on attributions about failure, typically in an achievement situation. Cognitions about loss, disruption, or other personally stressful events have been virtually ignored. Finally, most attributional analyses of depression have neglected the assessment of cognitions about consequences of negative outcomes. Although perceptions of the causes of events may affect the development or maintenance of depressive symptoms, other researchers have speculated on the importance of different cognitions. For example, Bandura (1977) and Wortman and Dintzer (1978) emphasize the role of cognitions about the meaning and implications of stressful events for one's sense of efficacy and one's perception of personal coping abilities. These alternative viewpoints suggest that attributional analyses may focus excessively on why an event occurred and leave related cognitions concerning implications of the event relatively unexplored.
The present study attempted to address several of these methodological and conceptual limitations by evaluating attributional and nonattributional cognitions about recent, personally stressful life events, employing both questionnaire and interview assessment. Two contrasting groups were chosen to help clarify the role of cognitive correlates of depression: moderately depressed persons with recent stress and nondepressed persons with high levels of recent life stress. A third group, composed of nondepressed individuals matched in number of stressful life events with the depressed group, was included in the questionnaire analyses to control for the possible effects of differing levels of stress between the two original groups. It was predicted that depressed and nondepressed persons would differ in their attributions and several nonattributional cognitions about recent life stresses.
Method

Participants and Procedure
Four hundred freshmen between the ages of 17 and 19 years enrolled in introductory psychology completed the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961 ) and a life stress inventory especially relevant to college students that covered events in the previous 6 months (adapted from Cochrane & Robertson, 1973) . All participants also completed an attribution questionnaire for each of their five most stressful recent events. The questionnaire, described in detail in Gong-Guy and Hammen (1980) , included questions about five attribution dimensions (control, locus, unintentionality, stability, and globality) and four nonattribution cognitions (degree of upset, expectation of occurrence, resulting uncertainty, and likelihood of recurrence) measured on 7-point scales.
Three subgroups were selected for comparison of their questionnaire responses on the basis of their scores on the BDI and reported number of life events. The depressed sample was comprised of all persons scoring 16 or above on the BDI and a random sample of those who scored 15. This group included 7 men and 27 women; their mean BDI score was 18.37 (SD = 3.1) and they reported a mean of 7.5 (SD = 3.7) stressful events. The nondepressed-high stress sample included individuals who scored below 9 on the BDI and had at least 8 stressful events. This group consisted of 9 men and 21 women who had a mean BDI score of 4.23 (SD = 2.0) and an average of 11.6 (SD = 2.4) recent events. The control sample was randomly selected from the remaining nondepressed students (who scored below 9 on the BDI) whose distribution of life stress events approximated that of the depressed sample. This group was composed of 14 men and 21 women, with a mean BDI of 3.97 (SD = 2.0) and 7.1 (SD = 1.9) life events. The nondepressed-high stress sample and the control group did not differ significantly from each other on depression level. Stress level was significantly different overall, F(2, 98) = 25.4, p < .001; the high stress group differed significantly from the other groups, but the latter did not differ from each other. A chi-square comparison of gender in the groups revealed no significant differences, X 2 (2) = 3.1,p>.05.
Interview. The depressed and nondepressed-high stress samples were interviewed within 2 to 3 weeks of questionnaire testing. The semistructured interview included diagnostic information (described in Hammen, 1980) as well as questions pertaining to participants' perceptions of their single most upsetting event within the past 6 months. Participants responded to questions concerning desire for the event's occurrence; expectation; control over the occurrence; attribution of cause to self, others, circumstances, or chance; control over the aspect of the self that was implicated in the event's cause; and avoidability of the event.
Results
Questionnaire-Based Attributions'
Mean of five most upsetting events. Mean attribution and cognition ratings across the five events chosen by each person were computed to index overall perceptions. The means are reported in Table 1 . For the traditional attribution dimensions (controllability, locus, unintentionality, stability, and globality), an overall multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) using Wilks's criterion was nonsignificant, F(10, 184) = .92, p > .10, indicating that the three groups did not differ overall in their attributional ratings. Univariate comparisons between groups are reported in Table 1 ; but where MANOVA results are nonsignificant these should be interpreted with extreme caution.
The three groups did differ significantly in their nonattribution cognitions, MANOVA F(8, 188) = 6.48, p < .001. Simple analyses of variance revealed significant differences for degree of upset, F(2, 97) = 7.40, p < .001, and uncertainty, F(2, 97) = 24.05, p < .001, with depressed students reporting more upset and greater uncertainty in their lives resulting from the events than either the nondepressed-high stress students or those in the control group.
Most distressing event.
Events that students rated as 7 on the 7-point scale of degree of upset (or 6 if they had rated none as 7) were analyzed separately in addition to the analyses reported above. In terms of causal perceptions, the three groups did not differ significantly overall, MANOVA F(10, 154)= 1.42, p>.10. On the other hand, nonattributional cognitions revealed overall significant group differences, MANOVA F(6, 164) = 3.55, p < .01! A statistically significant univariate difference was obtained for degree of uncertainty, F(2, 84) = 8.07, p < .001, and expectation of the event ap- proached significance, F(2, 84) = 2.91, p = .06. Depressed students, more so than the other two groups, experienced uncertainty and tended to report having expected the upsetting event to occur. It is of interest to note the patterns of mean differences for the items where univariate tests were significant. Attribution items show differences as a function of both high stress and depression. That is, post hoc analyses indicate that the responses of depressed and highly stressed but nondepressed individuals are similar to each other but different from those of nondepressed, less stressed individuals. However, nonattribution items appear to differ as a function of depression, with depressed participants tending to respond differently from nondepressed individuals regardless of stress level.
Interview-Assessed Attributions and Cognitions
The interview assessment of depressed and nondepressed-high stressed students was based on students' analyses of their single most distressing event, which included, for example, death of a parent, breaking up with a romantic partner, or being involved in an accident. The two groups did not differ on their subjective ratings of upset on the initial questionnaire; all rated the event at least 6 on a 7-point scale. Moreover, the groups did not differ in the "life change units" for the events (Cochrane & Robertson, 1973) .
In the interests of brevity, mean ratings are not presented. An overall comparison of students' responses approached significance, Hotelling's 7*(51) = 20.36, p = .07, suggesting a trend for the groups to differ in their perceptions. Since the overall comparison was not significant, univariate differences, again, should be interpreted with extreme caution. On individual dimensions, nondepressed persons assigned more responsibility for the event to other persons (30% vs. 18%), t(62) = 1.98, p = .05, and showed a trend toward reporting themselves as more able to have avoided or prevented the event, /(61) = 1.91, p = .06.
It must be noted that the results reported are based on groups designated as depressed or nondepressed two to three weeks prior to interview. Analyses of interview data were also performed comparing the 13 students diagnosed as having either a major or minor depressive disorder during the interview (see Hammen, 1980 , for details) and the 30 students who were not depressed at either the questionnaire assessment or the interview. Results indicate that there were no overall differences in perceptions between currently depressed and nondepressed students in either an overall multivariate test or individual item comparisons. Overall, it appears, therefore, that interview-based assessments of attributions and cognitions about stressful events were unable to distinguish currently depressed from nondepressed but highly stressed individuals.
Discussion
Comparisons of moderately depressed students, nondepressed but highly stressed students, and nondepressed students with levels of life stress equivalent to those of the depressed students failed to show theoretically predicted overall differences in questionnaire-assessed causal attributions for recent stressful events. In addition, further interview assessment of the clinically depressed and highly stressed but nondepressed students in the sample revealed no significant differences in perceptions and evaluations of the causes for their most upsetting recent event. However, certain other noncausal cognitions, assessed during the questionnaire phase, did distinguish the depressed from nondepressed individuals regardless of their stress level. Although the cognitive differences observed could just as easily have been consequences and not causes of depression, these results are congruent with cognitive mediational hypotheses of depression. However, they generate questions concerning attributional formulations specifically.
The absence of attributional differences in the current study, although somewhat discrepant from previous studies that have found relatively more internal, stable, and sometimes global ascriptions among depressed as opposed to nondepressed individuals, may reflect three factors that distinguish this study from the usual attributional investigations. One factor is the use of a nat-uralistic situation with personal significance in contrast to the contrived or hypothetical situations in controlled laboratory studies. A second factor is the assessment of cognitions typically related to loss or disruption as opposed to the general reliance on achievement situations that have clear standards for success and failure and, perhaps more importantly, reflect situations in which most people would agree that personal attributes are the major determinants of outcome. The third factor is population variables that may not have been adequately explored in attribution mediational models of depression. The results of the present study with college students who, by and large, were not seeking help for their difficulties may be a function of the fact that late adolescents might quite accurately perceive that many of their negative events were caused by persons and situations they could not control. Moreover, self-blaming attributions may require a developmental process of learning when one can and should be able to affect outcomes and might be an important precursor to help seeking, at least for problems with depression. Gong-Guy and Hammen (1980) found, for example, that adult clinic outpatients who are depressed make more internal ascriptions for the causes of their stressful events than do nondepressed patients. Thus, age and help-seeking may be population variables that relate to cognitions about life stresses.
Turning to a discussion of the cognitions that did distinguish depressed and nondepressed students in the present study, depressed persons reported themselves as significantly more upset by their events in general and saw events, especially the particularly upsetting ones, as causing significantly more uncertainty in their lives. These perceptions all involve cognitions about consequences of the stressful events. In this respect, they resemble aspects of Lazarus' constructs of primary (threat) and secondary (coping) appraisals of stressful events (Lazarus & Launier, 1978) . These observed differences are also compatible with Wortman and Dintzer's (1978) observation that cognitions concerning one's ability to cope with outcomes are probably as important, if not more important, than cognitions concerning causality for the outcome (p. 79). The present study is correlational, and other methods are needed to clarify the direction of effects. However, the results suggest a need for examining perceived consequences of negative events, as a supplement to the already intense focus on causal perceptions, in order to understand the role of cognitive mediators of stress and depression.
